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Peter Kivy 
What I like to call musical emotivists believe that when, under normal 
circumstances. musical critics. theorists or ordinary listeners call a 
pie,ce of music (say) "sad," it is because it makes us sad when we 
listen to it. According to what l call the musical cognitivist, music 
possesses emotive qualities that the listener recognizes there. In other 
words, we hear emotions in the music, we do not feel them in our­
selves. These are the qualities we are talking about when we call the 
music "happy" or "sad," "angry" or "melancholy," and the like. 
The first question that must occur to anyone reading these words is 
H0t.t' can music possibly 11 possess" emotions?' Hou• can musical sounds 
be happy or melancholy or angry? People can be happy or melancholy 
or angry; and perhaps some of the higher primates can as, well­
rnaybe even dogs and dolphins. But that is because they are sentient 
beings. For emotions are conscious states; and it seems, therefore, as 
absurd to impute emotions to music as to claim that a musical com­
i)osition could believe that today is Wednesday or doubt that the cat 
is on the mat. 
Many authors, including myself, have offered explanations of how 
music might really possess emotions as perceived qualities.1 There is 
not, as yet, much agreement on the question among those of the cog­
nidvist persuasion. Nor is there an emerging consensus that cogniti­
vism is correct and emotivism mistaken. There are still those who 
defend the view that music is sad in virtue of arousing sadness, angry 
in virtue of arousing anger, and so forth. What we do have, however, 
is a very visible group of philosophers, of varying opinions, who, 
although they do not agree upon how music possesses emotive quali­
ties, do agree that it does possess them, and that cognitivism in some 
form, not emotivism, provides the proper understanding of expres­
siveness in music. I count myself as one of this group. 
I have had my say on the question of how music embodies emotive 
qualities. My own view has its difficulties, as do the other contenders. 
And, I dare say, more work should, and undoubtedly wUI be done on 
the question. But given that there is now a substantial group of philo­
sophers who do at least agree that cognitivism of one kind or another 
is correct, it is time, I think, to forge ahead and, on the assumption 
that cognitivism is the correct analysis of musical expressiveness, see 
what sense we can make of the listening experiem:e, on the assump­
tion of its truth. That is what I propose to undertake here. 
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To begin with, it will be desirable to know just what emotions 
music can possess as perceptual qualities, and, if possible, why just 
th� and not others. For it ought to be obvious that music alone 
cannot possess just any emotive quality at all. It hardly requires an 
argument to convince that, for example, a piece of music can be 
mournful, but not neurotically mournful over the death of a canary; 
fearful, but not paranoiacally fearful of being kidnapped by gypsies. 
What this suggests is that music can possess general, but not specific 
emotions, and in part that is true. However, that cannot be the whole 
truth. For, on the other hand, music can be joyful, but not, I think, 
prideful, and here both emotions are .. general," as I have not said 
anything with regard to pride like "that specific feeling of pride one 
feels at the success of one's child," rather than "that specific feeling of 
pride one feels after fixing a dripping faucet." It is not because pride is 
an emotion more specific than joy that music can be expressive of the 
latter and not the former. What we can I think say is that those emo­
tions music is able to be expressive of it can be expressive of only in 
their general form. But what me the emotions that, in their general 
form, music can be expressive of? 
To answer this question, let us look, for a moment, at what are 
called the "objectless" emotions. In a seminal article on the subject, 
Julius Moravcsik has made an import.ant distinction between what he 
calls "Platonic Attitudes," such as pride, or respect, and those emo­
tions which I call (for obvious reasons) the "garden variety" emo­
tions," such as anger, joy, grief, and the like.2 The former require 
objects. One cannot, for example, wake up in the morning with an 
objectless, • •free floating'' feeling of pride or admiration, which then 
fastens upon some object or other in the course of the day. Rather, 
These feelings develop only as a result of our understand­
ing presenting various objects in certain ways. Without 
feelings we could not admire or be proud. But without 
interpretations of the entities that we encounter, these feel­
ings could not develop and have objects. These feelings 
develop and become directed towards objects as our 
understanding develops and yields interpretations of what 
we encounter in experience.3 
The Platonic attitudes are, then, non .. contingently attached to their 
objects: they cannot exist without objects, and the objects in part 
.. define" the attitudes. On the other hand, the garden variety emo­
tions, fear, grief, joy, and the like, although they do not normally 
occur in the absence of objects, can do at times, like my middle;of­
the--night anxiety, in which case they promptly take objects (except in 
what I suspect are pathological cases). 
A recent writer on the musical emotions, Daniel A. Putman, has 
quite perspicaciously observed that the line between those "emo­
tions" ( broadly speaking) that can, and those that cannot be predi­
cated of pure musical works is rather precisely drawn by Moravcsik,s 
distinction between what he calls the Platonic Attitudes and what I 3
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call the garden variety emotions. And his explanation o f  why is, I 
immodestly assert, equally perspicacious-immodestly because he 
makes use in it of my own account in The Corded Shell, with which he 
expresses substantial agreement. Putman 's point is 
that those same emotions that require objects in non, 
musical contexts are those which pure instrumental music 
cannot express. On the other hand, those emotions which 
are capable of being experienced non,musically without 
objects such as states of sadness or joy are those which are 
also the foundation of musical expression. 4 
And his explanation, which I would like to spin out and amplify 
somewhat with some suggestions of my own is, briefly, "that the con, 
tour of instrumental music, with its broad yet recognizable strokes. 
•fits' the contour of those broad emotions in life which, as feeling, 
states of the organism, can be independent of particular situations and 
can be transferred to a variety of diverse objects. "5 Let us see if we can 
understand this in terms of some nut5'and,bolts analysis. 
I argued in The Corded Shell .. that music is expressive in virtue of its 
resemblance to expressive human utterance and behavior. "6 The idea 
was that there are identifiable behavioral and linguistic routines and 
gestures generally associated with the garden variety emotions such as 
grief, anger, joy 1 and the others, and that because we are evolutionar­
ily. hard,wired to read ambiguous patterns as animate, whenever 
possible-the seeing,faces-in-clouds phenomenon-we tend to 1•read'' 
music emotively, where it gives us the opportunity to uread" it as 
animate. 
Now it is apparent that if this account is correct, the kinds of emo­
tions music is ordinarily said to be expressive of-namely, the garden 
variety emotions-are just the kinds we would expect to be there; and 
that the kinds it seems clear that music cannot be expressive of, the 
Platonic Attitudes, are just the kinds we would expect could not be 
embodied in musical compositions. For the Platonic Attitudes are 
uintellectual" emotions, if you will, so there are no standard bodily 
manifestations of them. Pride is expressed by your wearing your 
medals, displaying your golf trophies on the mantelpiece, making your 
friends listen to you play the Barcarole from Tales of Hoffmann on the 
saxophone: in unnumbered, and perhaps an infinite number of ways. 
But as there is no way for music to be perceived as being expressive of 
pd.de, in any obvious, standard way, analogous to some standard 
mode of human behavior, that emotion is excluded from music's 
expressive repertoire. 
Of course this is not to say that there are not unnumbered, perhaps 
infinite .. intellectual" ways of expressing the garden variety emotions 
as well. I can express my anger by throwing away my medals, locking 
my trophies in the closet, getting a new saxophone teacher. But the 
point is that the garden variety emotions do, as the Platonic Attitudes 
4
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do not, have standard behavioral responses too. That is why we are 
able to ascribe them to the lower animals: we can "read'' them in the 
visages and behavior of dogs and cats, where we cannot read pride or 
arrogance or respect without feeling that we are overly anthropomor­
phizing OUT pets. 
Thus, it appears to me that the satisfactory way in which Moravc­
sik's distinction between what he calls the Platonic .Attitudes and what 
I call the garden variety emotions separates the emotions music can, 
from those that it cannot be expressive of, lends some support, any­
way, to the gestural and linguistic account presented in The Cor;ded 
Shell of how music comes to be expressive of the garden variety emo­
tions in the first place. But, as I have said, one needn't share my view 
of how music is expressive of these emotions, just my belief that it is 
expressive of them in the sense of their being recognized in the music, 
not aroused by it, to follow and, I hope, accept the rest of my argu­
ment in this essay. We have some idea, in any case, of just what emo­
tions music can be expressive of. they a-re not the Platonic Attitudes 
but the garden variety emotions, fear, joy. anxiety, sadness, and the 
like, in their non.-specific form. We must ask now what the role, 
exactly, is that they play in the pure musical experience, when they are 
present. 
Let me begin with a rather simple example: the opening measures of 
a movement from a trio sonata, once attributed to Bach, but now 
thought perhaps to be by his student Goldberg. It is the beginning of a 
three-voiced double fugue; and the principal structural feature, to be 
exploited in the working out is a contrast between two themes of mus­
ically opposite character: the one in large note values, chromatic, and 
descending, the other in small note values, diatonic, and ascending in 
contrary motion. This is the description of the proceedings one· musi­
cian might give to another; and it would be perfectly adequate to 
them. We could understand pretty much all of the most obvious aes­
thetic features of this movement in these terms. 
But there are many people who are quite able to appreciate this 
composition, and who are unacquainted with even these elementary 
musical terms. How might I explain the workings of this fugue to 
them? Perhaps I would suggest that they observe the contrast between 
the tranquil, languid theme that seems to move slowly, and the vigor­
ous, more lively theme that goes along with it, and explain that it is 
that contrast between the languid tune, and the vigorous one that is 
being exploited here. 
And there is, of course, a third description I might give of the pro­
ceedings to the musical layman. I might urge that he or she observe 
the slightly melancholy theme that the composer combines with the 
more sprightly, upbeat and happy one, going on to suggest that the 
musical structure of the piece is built upon, plays with these two emo­
tively contrasted themes. 
5
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We have, then, two themes, each of which can be described in (at 
least) three different, but related ways, calling attention to various dif­
ferent, though, of course, related qualities. One of our themes is in 
whole notes, chromatic, and descending. It is tranquil; and it is a bit 
on the melancholy side. It is all of these things. Likewise, our other 
theme is in smaller note values, diatonic, ascending. It is vigorous; and 
it is sprightfully happy. It is all of these things. To appropriate an 
example of Charles Hartshorne's, from his intriguing and unduly neg­
lected book, The Philosophy and Psycholog:v of Sensation, canary yellow 
is (of course ) yellow; and it is bright; and it is cheerful; and the cheer­
fulness, no less than the other qualities, belongs to that color, as do 
che melancholy and happiness belong to those themes: "the emotional 
tonality is a part or aspect of the color or sound quality . . . . "7 
A further point I want to draw attention to is that the emotive qual­
ities of these themes, in the given musical context, belong necessarily 
co them. That is to say, the composer could not have chosen as one of 
his fugue subjects that descending chromatic theme in whole notes 
without getting, along with it, that slightly melancholy quality, any 
more than an interior decorator can choose canary yellow for a room 
without at the same time choosing a cheerful color: it comes with the 
territory. But-and this is a crucial point-this does not mean that the 
composer was the least bit interested in that melancholy quality, or 
that it plays any significant aesthetic role in his composition. Indeed, 1 
think that in this case it does not. In this particular composition the 
composer, it appears to me, wanted to work out the fugal implica .. 
tions, the fugal permutations and combinations of a chromatic des­
cending theme in whole notes against an ascending diatonic theme in 
contrary motion, with a more lively configuration, for contrast; and 
he wanted to do that within the modest proportions, and congenial 
domestic atmosphere of the trio sonata (rather than, for example, the 
more demanding and imposing dimensions of the organ fugue). The 
ascription of these goals seems all that is necessary to understand and 
to fully appreciate the aesthetic character of this small, but well 
brought off composition. 
Thus, if you were to ask me what aesthetic role that melancholy 
quality plays in the fugue, 1 would reply "None at all." If you were to 
ask me why, then, it is present, my answer would be that it came 
merely as a necessary concomitant of what is aesthetically operative, 
namely, the descending chromatic theme in whole notes. And if, 
finally, you were to press me for a method by which to tell when an 
expressive property is aesthetically operative in a work of pure 
instrumental music, I could but reply that there is no hard and fast 
rule, no formula. One does it case by case. And in the case at hand 
the expressive qualities do not force themselves upon us as either par­
ticularly prominent, or in any need of " interpretation." I can tell you 
the "story" of this fugue without mentioning its expressive properties, 
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and you will not feel the lack in the least. It ts a "story" about a des­
cending chromatic theme in whole notes, and its countersubject in 
contrary motion. That is all. The "melancholy" and "happiness" are 
simply the fuzz on the peach (although helpful. perhaps, as I indicated 
before, in pointing out features to the layman). 
But this does not get us out of the woods. The challenge thrown up 
to the cognitivist that he explain the role of expressive properties in 
music cannot be met by replying that they have none at all. For 
although it certainly is true that sometimes they don't, it seems a pal­
pable fact of musical experience that sometimes the expressive proper­
ties of musical works are so prominent. so demanding of our atten­
tion as to absolutely require an accounting. And were such properties 
extraneous to the works in which they are so prominently displayed, 
those works would have to be counted artistic failures for carrying 
such ostentatiously excessive baggage. Surely it would be too high a 
ransom to pay, (or rescuing a theory, to have to admit that the 
instrumental compositions of Schumann, Schubert and Brahms are all 
of them failed musical works, along with a large body of the classical 
literature, up to and including Beethoven. We are obliged, therefore, 
to see what the cognitivist can make of expressive properties in music 
where they importantly occur. 
By way of example, let us take a look at a very familiar (and wond­
erful) work in the concert repertoire, the First Symphony of Brahms, 
which will, I think, help to give us an idea of how the cognitivist can 
explain the aesthetic role of expressive properties, when they have one 
in a musical composition. I might have picked any movement of this 
work to illustrate my point. But perhaps the most memorable-and, 
indeed, one of the peaks of instrumental music, both for the layman 
and the expert-is the introduction and allegro that comprise the 
finale. And let me begin by quoting some of what that great Brahms 
enthusiast, Eduard Hanslick, had to say about the symphony, and this 
movement in particular, in his review of the work's Viennese pre­
miere ( 1876 ). Hanslick writes: 
In the first movement, the listener is held by fervent emo­
tional expression, by Faustian conflicts, and by a contra­
puntal art as rich as it is severe. The Andante softens this 
mood with a long-drawn-out, noble song, which experien­
ces surprising interruptions in the course of the move­
ment .. . .  The fourth movement begins most significantly 
with an Adagio in C minor; from darkening clouds the 
song of the woodland horn rises clear and sweet above the 
tremelo of the violins. All hearts tremble with the fiddles 
in anticipation. The entrance of the Allegro with its sim­
ple, beautiful theme, reminiscent of the "Ode to Joy" in 
the Ninth Symphony, is overpowering as it rises onward 
and upward right to the end.8 
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When the reader recalls that Hanslick is famous, even infamous for 
his view that expressive properties play no essential role in music, 
even, at least as I read him, that music is completely unable to be 
expressive of the garden variety emotions, the force with which the 
expressive properties of Brahms's First Symphony must impress 
themselves upon the listener is amply attested to by this exercise of 
Hanslick's in emotive music criticism. Here is the purist, in spite of 
himself, practically swept away by the expressiveness of Brahms's 
work, "contrapuntal art as rich as it is severe" to the contrary not­
withstanding. Such expressive properties surely must have a musical 
function, or we have, here, musical anatomy as superfluous as the 
vermiform appendix and as prominent as an elephant's probboscis. 
What can that function be? 
The answer. it seems to me, is surprisingly simple. The function of 
an expressive property in a work of pure instrumental music is no dif­
ferent from the function of any other musical property of such a 
work-the chromaticism (say) of that fugue subject in the trio sonata. 
For an expressive property is a musical property-as Hartshorne says, 
"the emotional tonality is a part or aspect of the .. .  sound quality ... "; 
and its function is to be musically exploited, musically developed, 
musically played with, musically built with and built upon. along with 
the rest of the musical qualities it may be in company with. That is all; 
and that is enough. But it is not enough, of course, merely to 
announce this in strong language as an article of faith. So let me try to 
make good this claim by looking, as I said 1 would, at the finale of 
Brahms's First Symphony, which will serve as an illustrative example. 
Hanslick, as we saw, describes the symphony as a kind of expressive 
parade, with mood following mood; and this is perhaps the most 
common way of describing the standard concert repertoire to the 
layman, the stock in trade of the program annotator. Of course we 
could describe the very same sections of the music that Hanslick des­
cribes here emotively, in purely musical terms: the technical terms of 
music theory and analysis. Or we might, also, describe them in phe­
nomenological terms other than emotive ones. These are the same 
choices we faced in describing the themes in the fugue discussed pre­
viously, and, indeed, the same ones we face describing any other 
music in the modern Western tradition (although some music may 
fail to have expressive properties). 
So, for example, Hanslick describes the opening Adagio of the 
Brahms finale as initially characterized by "darkening clouds"; and as 
it does not appear that Hanslick thinks Brahms's music is giving a 
weather report, I think we can take this as a metaphor for a dark emo­
tive tone. My own description would be anxiety (the pizzicato pas­
sages ) tinged with melancholy (the opening, bars), or something like 
that. 
Hanslick continues, "from the darkening clouds the song of the 
8
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woodland horn rises dear and sweet . . . .  " Again, I do not think Hans.­
lick wants himself to be taken here as suggesting we attribute repres­
entational or programmatic features to the music; so we must, as 
before, understand this as a mood or emotion metaphor. It is the feel­
ing tone of the "woodland horn" that is being alluded to: the cheerful 
but somewhat contemplative, perhaps even slightly reverential mood 
that the music possesses; the kind of mood, one supposes, that :natu­
ral surroundings might arouse in a nineteenth-century Romantic with 
somewhat pantheistic sympathies. 
The section which follows this one hard by is passed over by Hans­
lick in his description;. but it is eminent! y worthy of notice. In con­
trast to the famous horn solo, we now have a rather somber and 
serious mood introduced by the trombones, those most somber and 
funereal of instruments. 
That the solemnity is on the religious, "churchy" side will be sug­
gested to everyone by the hymn-like rhythm and distinctly plagal 
harmonies.. For those who know the musical association of trombones 
with the archaic and religious, this mood will be even more vividly 
apparent. ( ls it too far off the wall to suggest that Brahms is contrast, 
ing two "religious" moods here: the lighthearted, optimistic mood of 
secular, pantheistic nature worship with the more pessimistic and 
dark emotions that go with the Lutheran faith?) 
The horn theme returns, is musically developed with increasing 
pace and urgency; and finally, as Hanslick so aptly puts it, "All hearts 
tremble with the fiddles in anticipation" of the wonderful Allegro 
theme, with its mood of steadfast confidence and joy, so well known 
that it is hardly necessary to quote it here. 
Now I said we might describe these emotionally charged sections in 
pure musical terms, or in phenomenological terms that avoid emotive 
predicates; and so we might. There is the chromaticism of the open­
ing, the diatonic harmony 0£ the second section, with the characteris­
tic "horn fifths," the modal, plagal harmony of the passage for trom­
bones, and so on. Or if you prefer a non-technical description of the 
musical surface, in non-expressive terms, the first section is agitated 
and muddy, the second tranquil and clear, the third rather in between, 
dark but n.ot muddy, calm and stately, without the agitation of the 
opening phrases. Not, of course, do these bare bones descriptions 
even begin to exhaust ·the possibilities. 
But here the hard-nosed upurist" might well object that since there 
are these other, alternative ways of describing the music, there is abso­
lutely no r,eason to describe it emotively. Indeed, what grounds have I 
for doing so, since I have already admitted that, in describing the 
fugue by Bach (or Goldberg or whomever), there was no need to: that 
everything musically significant about the movement could be said in 
music-theoretical terms? 
The answer to the purist must be that in the case of the fugue., the 
9
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description in music-theoretical terms does exhaust the musically sig­
nificant features, whereas in the case of the Brahms symphony it does 
not. It of course does not follow that because two descriptions of 
something are possible, one of them must be superfluous. But how do 
I know that the emotive description is not superfluous for a complete 
accounting of the Brahms? Well simply because the expressive proper­
ties are just too prominent to disregard. Brahms has put neon signs 
around them, hung them with bells: they are as conspicuous as the 
spots on a Dalmation. And were I to offer an interpretation of this 
work only in theoretical terms, or even offer both a theoretical 
accounting and a phenomenological one that avoided emotive predi­
cates, I would leave the listener in quite justifiable puzzlement. Why 
this intensely melancholy section? Why that bright happy one? Why 
expressive properties at all, in such obvious intensity? It can't be an 
accident. How can the musical analyst leave such questions unad­
dressed and still claim to have given an adequate account of Brahms's 
First Symphony? 
Here, however, the purist's opposite number, the wild-eyed emoti­
vist·, will jump into the fray with an equally unwelcome suggestion. 
Yes., of course, the emotive properties of this symphony absolutely 
demand recognition and explanation; and it is dear what the explana­
tion must be: either that these properties are there to move us or that 
they are there to tell us something - to tell us about emotions or 
about emotion-filled happenings in "life." The former claim-that the 
expressive properties of music are dispositional properties cashed out 
in terms of the power to move us emotionally-I have previously 
dealt with.9 The latter claim must be faced up to now. But what is 
there about it that carries conviction? 
I suppose the argument might go something like this. When we 
explain what is happening in the musical work in purely music­
theoretical terms, there is, of course, no need to reach outside of the 
music for any part of our explanation. The terms are technical, apply 
only to music, and serve to render understandable the workings of 
pure musical structure. But where emotive terms become necessary to 
describe what is happening in the music, they demand at the same 
time an extra-musical accounting. We need not appeal to ''life" to 
explain why such-and-such a harmonic progression is the way of get­
ting from the development to the recapitulation, but we do to explain 
why such .. and .. such a deeply melancholy progression was chosen to 
get from one intensely joyful section to another. Why melancholy? 
Surely a purely musical explanation is not possible. What we need, 
since these are primarily names for the conscious states of human 
beings, is an explanation that brings in the lives and emotions of 
human beings. This sequence from joy to sorrow to joy must be 
intended to tell us something about human joy and sorrow; or, per­
haps, it represents an emotive "happening"; or it tells an emotive 
10
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story. In any event, it is "about" the emotions predicated of it in 
some way or other. 
Now perhaps there are better arguments than this one for the 
"aboumess" view of musical expression. And my lack of ingenuity in 
thinking of any may, I dare say, be laid to my obvious aversion to 
such views which, so far as I can see, deny the very premise of this 
paper: that there is pure, non-referential music, and a pure musical 
experience of it. But however that may be, the argument before us is 
not a convincing one. For there is no more reason to infer that sad 
music must be about sadness than to infer that quiet music must be 
about quietness, ttanquil music about tranquility, or turbulent music 
about turbulence. AH of the "phenomenological" descriptions we give 
of music use terms that have reference to "life" as well as to music: 
this is not just a characteristic of the sub-class of emotive descrip­
tions. So anyone who wishes to argue that because "sad'' has a refer­
ence not only to music but, far more basically, to conscious human 
states, sad music must be about sadness, will have to argue, as well, 
that because "tranquil" and "quiet" and .. turbulent" have reference 
not only to music but, far more basically, to natural phenomena and 
human behavior, ttanquil and quiet and turbulent music must be 
about those things: about tranquil days, quiet nights, turbulent lives. 
But surely that is absurd. Because music can be sad and joyful, ttan­
quil and quiet, it can represent, or be about sadness and joy, tranquil­
ity and quietude; but it is so only in certain circumstances. Those cir­
cumstances we will get to at the conclusion. For now we need only 
observe that music alone is about nothing at all; and the inference 
from its sadness or joy, tranquility or turbulence Ito its "aboutness" a 
false one. A fugue may be chromatic, and tranquil, and melancholy; 
but it is no more, on that account, about melancholy than about tran­
quility; and no more about tranquility than about chromaticism. 
But perhaps one wants to say that music is about itself, and hence a 
chromatic fugue is, indeed, about chromaticism. Perhaps one wants to 
say, further, that a musical composition is just about all of its quali­
ties. So as the fugue is not only chromatic but ttanquil and melan­
choly, it is about tranquility and melancholy as well. And so the 
defender of the "aboutness11 view of musical expression seems to have 
his desired conclusion: the music is about the emotions. 
However, he indeed only seems to have his conclusion. Actually, it 
is but a Pyrrhic victory. For in gaining the right, in this way, to say 
that sad ·music is about sadness, the emotivist has paid the extravagant 
price of giving up any claim to the extra-musical reference of usad11 
which was, to start with, the whole point of the exercise. The emoti­
vist demands an explanation that reaches beyond the pure musical 
parameters because, he claims, we can find no reason for the place­
ment or sequence of expressive properties within the confines of 
music alone. But in adopting the reflexive mode of " about," he com-
11
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mits himself to just such an internal explanation and that only. He has 
acquiesced in the view I am defending-that the expressive properties 
of music are purely musical properties. to be understood in a purely 
musical way. 
Now there may be theoretical advantages, a theoretical point in say­
ing "The fugue is about chromaticism'' rather than "The fugue is 
chromatic," "The fugue is about ttanquiliry" rather than "The fugue 
is rranquil, 1 1  "The fugue is, about sadness" rather than "The fugue is 
sad," assuming that these are all special cases of "The fugue is about 
itself." And these two different ways of talking about the same thing 
do make a difference: a difference in the " logical'' status of music, or 
in its "metaphysical" status. What they do not make any difference at 
all in is its "content," if you mean by its "content" anything beyond 
the music itself. 
So we are again arrived at the conclusion that the expressive prop­
erties of music alone are purely musical properties, understandable in 
purely musical terms. And why shouldn't they be? No one, as I have 
argued, seems compelled to seek an explanation from the ••outside" 
for the phenomenological properties of music that are not the expres­
sive ones. That a composer should want to combine a calm fugue sub­
ject with a vigorous countersubject seems easily understandable on 
purely aesthetic grounds, on grounds at least of musical contrast if 
nothing more interesting than that. Why then need we seek any 
further for an explanation of why a composer wishes to combine a 
joyous subject with an anguished countersubject! Music alone is a 
quasi-syntactic structure of musical properties, some of which are 
describable in phenomenological terms. That among the phenomeno­
logical properties are expressive ones makes this quasi-syntactic struc­
ture more interesting to human beings, but not semantic in any but an 
adulatory sense of cc meani ngful" that is unhappily misleading. 
There are musical structures stuffed with expressive properties, like 
Brahms's First Symphony, and musical structures where such proper­
ties are absent or irrelevant. In the case of the Brahms, we must seek 
musical understanding not in extta-musical interpretations of the 
expressive properties but in seeing the work as a sttucture of musical 
properties, among which are expressive ones. And there is no magic 
formula, no philosopher's stone for doing so. Indeed, it is not a philo­
sopher's job to do it, or tell others how it is done. 
But there is no mystery about it either. Some expressive properties 
serve to highlight musical structure, as color might be used by the 
painter to emphasize contour or mass. Other expressive properties 
serve as structural properties in their own right. And an expressive 
property, in a work of pure instrumental music, no more needs extra­
musical accounting for, as I have said, than does any other phenome­
nological property of the music. Of course, a composition may pos­
sess expressive properties for which there seem to be no real musical 
12
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functions-properties which obtrude. but seem to lack for a musical 
reason. However, these are cases not of musical meaning but of musi­
cal failure. We all know such musical works. They are the ones we 
describe as "overblown," or ' 'puffed up," or "emorionally insincere." 
These metaphors suggest, of course, emotional "content" which the 
composer has been unable to deal with successfully. like a poet whose 
verses are not up to his subject. In char sense they are dangerous and 
misleading metaphors. For there is no content at all, and the fa ilure is 
a purely musical one. Grand musical gestures, whether expressive, or 
of some other kind, demand grand musical powers .. An ambitiously 
expressive theme demands a superior mind for its working out, as 
does an ambitiously chromatic one, or even an ambitiously long one. 
And the opening theme of Brahms's First Symphony, in all of its 
overpowering emotive intensity. could no more be dealt with satisfac­
torily by (say) August Klughart (a worthy but minor contemporary) 
than could the chromatic subject of the Musical Offering be worked 
out to a really satisfactory conclusion by Telemann. But whereas Tel­
emann's failure would quite naturally be seen as a musical failure, 
pure and simple, the failure to deal with expressive properties tends to 
be seen as a failure to deal with content. This is a mistake. The latter 
is a musical failure too, and nothing more. 
Needless to say, it is no accident that expressive properties abound 
in musical works of the Romantic period. That of course requires an 
explanation, and has one. Certainly, many Romantic composers 
thought they were ••saying things" about emotions, or about them­
selves when they wrote expressive music; and that is no doubt one of 
the reasons they did so, since they also thought it was important to 
ftsay things" in music about emotions and about themselves. But we 
needn't share their views or use their views to interpret their music. 
This was neither the first time nor the last that great art has been 
created under the aegis of false, or even absurd theories. The impor­
tant point is that those who wrote pure instrumental music in the 
nineteenth century were also serving another mistress: the Muse of 
pure musical structure, who sponsors expressive properties as well. If 
Brahms may have thought that he was t•saying things" about emo­
tions, or about himself in writing the First Symphony (and l have no 
idea whether he did or not) what he did do was write one of the most 
successful pieces of pure instrumental music in the repertoire. What­
ever else he may have thought that he had done, possible or impossi, 
ble, that he did. 
I have not, to be sure, lost sight of a point I mad!e in passing, earlier, 
that because music can possess expressive properties, it is susceptible 
of extta,musical interpretations that rely upon them. And I would like 
to revert to that point in concluding this paper. 
One way of thinking about logical systems is simply as sets of rules 
for manipulating physical marks on paper. On this way of thinking, 
13
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we are not to imagine the "horseshoe" as meaning "therefore," or the 
uwedge" as "or." Indeed, we are not to think of these logical connec­
tives as meaning anything at all. Rather, we are to represent chem to 
ourselves merely as "objects" that the rules tell us we can put together 
with certain other "objects" in certain permissible ways, and not oth­
ers. When we think of a logical system in this way, it is an "uninter­
preted" logical system. 
Of course we can, for various reasons, put an interpretation on a 
system if its logical structure is amenable. That is what we are doing 
when we say that the horseshoe means "therefore" and the wedge 
"or." In that case the system is no longer an uninterpreted system but 
an interpreted one. 
Now it seems to me that an illuminating way of looking at pure 
instrumental music is as an uninterpreted structure. But like an unin­
terpreted logical system, it can be interpreted in ways that the nature 
of its structure permits. Because a piece of music can be calm and 
then agitated, it can be interpreted as representing, perhaps, a calm 
and then agitated life, or a tranquil and then stormy seascape. And 
because a piece of music can be melancholy and then joyful, it can be 
interpreted as representing a melancholy and then joyful human expe­
rience, or a melancholy followed by a joyful event. The obvious ques .. 
tion to ask, of course, is when, under what conditions we are entitled 
.to interpret a musical structure? And the natural answer is: when the 
composer licenses it. 
Beethoven, for example, invites us-no, demands us-to interpret 
the quiet ending of the Coriolanus overture as representing the death 
of Coriolanus, or at least as having reference to some event in his life 
appropriate to the music simply by giving that title to the work. Sup­
po.se it had had no title at all, but merely an opus number? Beethoven, 
being the kind of composer he was, produced, in the Coriolanus over­
ture, an aesthetically perfect piece of instrumental music that can be 
appreciated on its own terms. And the unusual, quiet ending, being a 
return of the opening, is perfectly justified as a rounding out of the 
pure musical design. But the title, and Beethoven's well known inten­
tions in writing the work, along with considerations of pure musical 
design, give the close a more complete and satisfying explanation than 
a purely musical explanation would do. In any case, the point is that 
because music has the phenomenal properties it does, it is amenable 
to various kinds of extra-musical interpretations appropriate to them, 
as the horseshoe is amenable to the interpretation "therefore" because 
of its pure logical properties. The Coriolanus overture is to Brahms's 
First Symphony as applied to pure mathematics. 
At this point, I imagine, someone might suggest that if any piece of 
"pure" instrumental music can be interpreted, which I freely admit, 
there does not seem to be any compelling reason why it shouldn't be, if 
a listener finds that that facilitates his or her enjoyment of the work. 
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What is wrong with hearing heroes and shipwrecks in Beethoven 's 
Fifth if you are clever enough to do so? Indeed. shouldn't we applaud 
your cleverness? 
Many answers might be given to this quesuon (and have been). But 
it seems to me that the most readily apparent one is that to put an 
interpretation on a piece of music alone is to close oneself off from 
one of the most satisfying and engrossing experiences that the arts 
have to offer us. I dare say that there are many people who cannot 
enjoy pure instrumental music without making up stories, without 
interpreting it, which, of course, is to say that they cannot enjoy pure 
instrumental music at all, since what they enjoy is not the work of 
pure music but another work, a work of interpreted music, which 
they have produced in collaboration with the composer. Perhaps pure 
instrumental music is caviar to the general. I guess I really think that it 
is. But if that conclusion comes across as being intolerably elitist, let 
me add, in amelioration, that caviar, after �11. is an acquired taste. 
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